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Affective states are known to influence behavior and cognitive processes. To assess
mood (moderately long-term affective states), the cognitive judgment bias test was
developed and has been widely used in various animal species. However, little is
known about how mood changes, how mood can be experimentally manipulated,
and how mood then feeds back into cognitive judgment. A recent theory argues that
mood reflects the cumulative impact of differences between obtained outcomes and
expectations. Here expectations refer to an established context. Situations in which
an established context fails to match an outcome are then perceived as mismatches
of expectation and outcome. We take advantage of the large number of studies
published on non-verbal cognitive bias tests in recent years (95 studies with a total
of 162 independent tests) to test whether cumulative mismatch could indeed have
led to the observed mood changes. Based on a criteria list, we assessed whether
mismatch had occurred with the experimental procedure used to induce mood (mood
induction mismatch), or in the context of the non-verbal cognitive bias procedure (testing
mismatch). For the mood induction mismatch, we scored the mismatch between the
subjects’ potential expectations and the manipulations conducted for inducing mood
whereas, for the testing mismatch, we scored mismatches that may have occurred
during the actual testing. We then investigated whether these two types of mismatch
can predict the actual outcome of the cognitive bias study. The present evaluation
shows that mood induction mismatch cannot well predict the success of a cognitive bias
test. On the other hand, testing mismatch can modulate or even inverse the expected
outcome. We think, cognitive bias studies should more specifically aim at creating
expectation mismatch while inducing mood states to test the cumulative mismatch
theory more properly. Furthermore, testing mismatch should be avoided as much as
possible because it can reverse the affective state of animals as measured in a cognitive
judgment bias paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last years, interest in affective states in animals has
increased (Boissy et al., 2007; Veissier and Boissy, 2007) because
these states are thought to reflect welfare from the perspective
of the animals (Kendrick, 2007; Yeates and Main, 2008). Also,
affective states may be highly relevant for the proximate control
of behavior (Gygax, 2017). Here, we use “affective states” as a
general term encompassing any affective experience. It is assumed
that different types of affective states are relevant for different
periods of time (Spruijt et al., 2001; Posner et al., 2005; Mendl
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, all states can be characterized by
their valence dimension (positive vs. negative; Kron et al., 2015).
Emotions, that is, short-term affective states, refer to adaptive
processes as part of the basic mechanism that allows animals to
avoid punishment and reach reward when directly confronted
with internal and external stimuli (Panksepp, 1994; Rolls, 2000).
According to Schachter and Singer (1962), subjective emotional
response to a situation is thought to occur through a process
of appraisal after a series of stimulus checks (e.g., suddenness,
familiarity, predictability, pleasantness). Emotions are relatively
intense and short-lived affective reactions. Mood differs from
emotions in that it represents a state that typically lasts longer
over a moderate period of time such as days or weeks (Eldar
et al., 2016). Mood is less tightly linked to particular events and
is thought to reflect the cumulative impact of multiple stimuli
(e.g., depression; Mendl et al., 2010b; Nettle and Bateson, 2012;
Eldar et al., 2016). In some of the literature, the terms affective
states and traits are used. Affective states are characterized by
situational or contextual factors observable as within-individual
variability. Affective traits on the other hand are constant over
long periods of time and specific to each individual (Luthans and
Youssef, 2007; Kluember et al., 2009; Faustino et al., 2015). Traits
encompass, e.g., how individuals deal with affective situations in
general and can be considered part of their personality. We refer
to mood as an affective state that persists over some time rather
than being a fleeting response to a single event (Luthans and
Youssef, 2007; Kivumbi, 2011; Faustino et al., 2015).
Mood is likely to be relevant to understand animal and
human behavior because it seems that subjects in a more positive
mood state deal more easily with negative short-term experiences
(i.e., they are more “optimistic”, Mendl et al., 2009, 2010b).
A positive mood might therefore alleviate single negative events
and stabilize emotional reactions, that is, subjects will react
also less strongly to positive events (Mendl et al., 2009, 2010b;
Muehlemann et al., 2011; Laeger et al., 2012; Reefmann et al.,
2012). On the contrary, a negative mood state might taint
experiences quite generally (Rottenberg et al., 2005; Grippo and
Johnson, 2009, Groenwold et al., 2013). Mood states become
particularly important and visible in situations of ambiguity and
uncertainty where the expectation of a subject (optimism and
pessimism) is pre-shaped to a smaller extent by the circumstances
of the situation (Schachter and Singer, 1962; Mendl et al., 2009;
Roelofs et al., 2016).
Human studies have shown that affective states influence
cognitive processes, therefore a cognitive bias can indicate a
specific mood state (Paul et al., 2005). Cognitive biases influence
emotional responses by altering the processing of affective
information (i.e., a shift in judgment; Mendl et al., 2009).
This becomes important and visible specifically in situations of
ambiguity and uncertainty because the decision to be taken is
shaped less clearly by the situation itself (Roelofs et al., 2016).
It is thought that a more negative mood engenders negative
judgments (Kavanagh and Bower, 1985; Headey and Veenhoven,
1989; Mayer et al., 1992). Moreover, mood affects decision-
making (Brydges et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2015), risk-taking
(Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001), learning (Vögeli et al., 2014), and
motivation (Rygula et al., 2015).
Recently, Eldar et al. (2016) presented the first concise and
coherent theory on mood. They argued that mood reflects the
cumulative impact of differences between obtained outcomes and
expectations in an established context (i.e., mismatches). Often, it
is impossible to determine what a non-verbal individual expects.
We use the term ‘expectation’ to reflect a situation in which the
stage has been set for the individual to anticipate a particular
outcome that may or may not match the observed outcome,
without making any assumption about the internal mental state
of the individual. That is, the emotional mismatches occurring in
a subject’s life are thought to influence their future mood, thanks
to positive or negative feedback. In turn, mood biases the way that
outcomes are perceived (i.e., valuation of subsequent outcomes,
Huntsinger, 2012; Eldar et al., 2016) and this bias affects learning
about those outcomes. In this sense, mood represents the “overall
momentum” of recent unexpected outcomes (Eldar et al., 2016).
In other terms, mood does not result from cumulative recent
rewards or punishments but depends whether cumulative recent
outcomes were better or worse than expected. Behavioral and
neural findings suggest that mood biases the perception of reward
outcomes such that outcomes are perceived better than they are
when a subject is in a good mood, and worse than they really are
when the subject is in a bad mood (Eldar et al., 2016). In humans,
Headey and Veenhoven (1989) suggest that a positive mood state
results in an appreciation of the life-as-a-whole, helps to cope
with problems and can even alleviate negative events. Yet, it can
also induce a rosy perspective, that is, an optimistic outlook which
may also, for example, masks the individual personal problems
(Headey and Veenhoven, 1989). Mathews and MacLeod (2005)
and Gotlib and Joormann (2010) agree in saying that a negative
mood state is characterized by pessimistic automatic thoughts
and biases in attention, interpretation and memory towards
negative situations and events.
To measure mood in animals, the non-verbal cognitive
judgment bias test has been introduced as the standard approach
(Harding et al., 2004; Mendl et al., 2009). In this test, subjects are
trained to link a cue with a rewarding event and another cue (on
the same physical axis) with an aversive event. Subjects are then
confronted with ambiguous cues. If the behavioral reaction to
ambiguous cues is more similar to that shown in response to the
rewarding cue the animal is considered to be in a more optimistic
state. On the contrary, if the reaction reflects the one shown
in response to the negative cue, the animal is considered being
more pessimistic. In many studies implementing a cognitive bias
test, an attempt is made to manipulate the mood state of the
animals in some form of mood induction (Bethell, 2015). For
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instance, mood can be manipulated in animals by multiple short-
term changes (e.g., husbandry interventions, social introductions,
chronic stress), moderately long-term modification (e.g., housing
conditions) and therapeutics drugs (Mendl et al., 2009; Bethell,
2015; Bethell et al., 2016; Hales et al., 2016). These attempts
include changes in the internal or external environment that
deteriorate or improve conditions. The basis for such claims is
based more on common sense rather than deep prior knowledge.
The effectiveness of the mood induction was shown to be higher
if different types of manipulations were combined (Westermann
et al., 1996). Mendl et al. (2009) found that more diverse and
unrelated manipulations (e.g., unpredictable housing conditions)
resulted in predicted changes in judgment bias more often. In
this way, multiple short-term manipulations can be thought
of producing mismatches that would then causally influence
mood. Also, the manipulations have not usually been shaped
by the aim of producing mismatches that are viewed as the
cause of mood changes by Eldar et al. (2016). In many studies,
in addition to the “treated” group, a control group is used to
allow for comparisons (see Baciadonna and McElligott, 2015).
However, despite the number of publications suggesting that
this approach is now well established to probe moderately to
long-term mood in various species (Mendl et al., 2009), the
results of experiments are still not unequivocal (Wichman et al.,
2012; Anderson et al., 2013; Scollo et al., 2014; Guldimann
et al., 2015; Roelofs et al., 2016). Results are not always in line
with the prediction, sometimes even showing that mood had
been influenced in the contrary direction as expected (e.g., see
Doyle et al., 2010; Burman et al., 2011; Brydges et al., 2012;
Parker et al., 2014). For example, it has been hypothesized that
restraining individuals will lead to a more negative mood and,
accordingly result in a more negative judgment of ambiguous
cues. However, these individuals were reported to display a
more positive judgment of the ambiguous cues than control
individuals (Doyle et al., 2010; Briefer Freymond et al., 2014;
Wheeler et al., 2015; Horváth et al., 2016). Additionally, similarly
valenced states, such as depression, anxiety and fear, do not
always have the same effects on a situation cognitive appraisal
(Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Indeed, little is known what exactly
causes changes in mood and it is not well understood how
mood then influences cognitive judgment (Mendl et al., 2009). It
remains elusive how short-term emotional reactions accumulate
and feed back into the perception of outcomes (Eldar and Niv,
2015).
Here, we take advantage of the large number of studies
published on non-verbal cognitive bias tests in recent years
that include an experimental manipulation of mood, to test
whether cumulative mismatch could indeed have led to the
observed results in the cognitive bias test (Eldar et al., 2016).
To do so, we extended the list of studies presented by Gygax
(2014) and Knapp et al. (2015). In 95 studies, we reviewed
the conditions used to manipulate mood in respect to whether
mismatch was likely to have occurred at different times in the
timeline. Based on a criteria list, we assessed whether prior to
the test a “mood induction mismatch” occurred, i.e., whether
the experimental procedure used to induce mood contained
aspects that can be viewed as creating cumulative mismatch.
In cognitive bias tests, the testing procedure itself is thought
to have a potential influence on the animals’ reaction in the
test (e.g., Doyle et al., 2010). Therefore, we additionally assessed
whether at the time of testing a “testing mismatch” occurred,
i.e., whether the testing procedure itself could have induced a
mismatch based on a second list of criteria. We then investigated
whether these two types of mismatch could predict the actual
outcome and interpretation of the cognitive bias test in the
collected studies. This outcome was scored as either fitting
with the hypothesis (a cognitive bias could be supported by
the data as expected by the author(s)), none (no cognitive
bias could be supported), or contrary to the hypothesis (bias
in the unexpected direction was supported by the data). The
author(s)’ hypotheses were mainly based on human literature.
They seem reasonable in our view and were presumably backed-
up by the reviewers and editor of these papers at the time of
publication. We focused on quantitative tests of these hypotheses
made at the level of a group of subjects (either comparing
a ‘treated’ group with a control group or testing the same
individuals in different conditions). According to Eldar et al.
(2016), we expected that the experimental mood induction
would be successful if it included cumulative mismatch (“mood
induction mismatch”). This success may be modulated if the
cognitive bias testing itself produced some additional mismatch
(“testing mismatch”).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We used the list of published studies involving a cognitive bias
approach by Gygax (2014) and Knapp et al. (2015), as a starting
point. We complemented the list by studies published, or in
press and available online, between the time point of the search
in Gygax (2014) and July 31st 2017. Studies were identified,
as in Gygax (2014), by searching the Web of Science1 using
a cited-reference search for ‘Harding et al. (2004)’ combined
with (OR) the key word combination ‘[(cognitive AND bias
AND welfare) OR (judgment AND bias AND welfare)]’. We
used an additional search consisting of a cited-reference search
for ‘Harding et al. (2004)’ combined with (AND) the key word
combination ‘[(cognitive AND bias) OR (judgment AND bias)]’,
a third search with the key word combination ‘(affective AND
state) AND [(cognitive AND bias) OR (judgment AND bias)]’,
and a fourth search with the key word combination ‘(state
AND affect) AND [(cognitive AND bias) OR (judgment AND
bias)]’. We also conducted the latter search using ‘(affective
AND state) OR ((cognitive AND bias) OR (judgment AND
bias))’. With this search, >20’000 hits were reached. The first
dozens of hits were irrelevant to a large extent and therefore,
we did not further pursue this line of search. For this review,
only studies that attempted to actively induce mood or in
which mood was independently inferred (e.g., based on self-
reports, behavioral, or physiological data) were considered. Other
methodological studies were excluded from this analysis, as well
as publications including fewer than 4 subjects (per treatment
1http://www.webofknowledge.com
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group), because they are lacking the necessary degrees of freedom
for a quantitative statistical evaluation at group level. Up to the
day of the final literature search, we found a total of 95 studies
including 162 independent cognitive bias tests that reflected our
sample size (for a list of the studies see Supplementary Material).
Outcome of the Cognitive Bias Test
The outcome of the studies was assessed and categorized as
‘fitting’ with the hypothesis when there was evidence for the
hypothesis that was originally formulated by the authors in the
source papers (and presumably backed-up by the reviewers and
editor of these papers). These hypotheses were also coherent with
what one would assume based on the literature. In these cases,
a cognitive bias based on the mood induction was supported by
the data. The outcome was deemed ‘contrary’ when there was
evidence in the contrary direction to the original hypothesis, that
is, the cognitive bias was inverse to the one expected, or as ‘none’
if no evidence for a difference in cognitive bias was found. Here,
we took a p-value of p ≤ 0.05 (statistically “significant”) at any of
the ambiguous cue values in the original study as the criterion for
fitting or contrary outcomes.
Mood Induction Mismatch
The cumulative mismatch according to the mood induction
method (‘mood induction mismatch’) was assessed and
categorized either as a negative mismatch, no mismatch, or
positive mismatch. Indeed, an attempt to manipulate mood in our
sample of studies does not necessarily lead to a mood induction
mismatch, because subjects need to experience differences
between obtained outcomes and expectations to qualify for a
mismatch. Here, we base our judgment of an expectation solely
on the fact that the subjects experienced certain aspects of
their environment that were experimentally changed for mood
induction and accordingly caused a potential mismatch. In order
to be considered cumulative, the experimental manipulations
needed to be either repeated at least twice or applied during
several days, excepted for pharmacological treatments which
mimic the effect of a cumulative mismatch. Pharmacological
treatments are used to more directly manipulate the animal’s
‘internal (neural) state’ (Mendl et al., 2009). This approach
is also used to validate the physiological mechanism by
showing that the pharmacological manipulation leads to the
predicted judgment bias (e.g., Peet and Peters, 1995; Doyle
et al., 2011a; Destrez et al., 2012). On the other hand, the
use of an a priori appropriate pharmacological treatment
can reverse the effect of an environmental manipulation
on bias (e.g., Karagiannis et al., 2015). Also, behavioral and
physiological measures can be used to provide insight into the
past subjective experiences of individuals (Verbeek and Lee,
2014).
Additionally, we wanted originally to take into account
the mismatch intensity (e.g., number of repetitions, treatment
intensity and the duration of the treatment phase). However,
the exact reporting of these measures was often lacking and
could therefore not be consistently quantified across studies.
Because these quantitative aspects were highly diverse between
the studies, we did not make an attempt to integrate them in, for
example, several levels of scoring negative and positive mismatch.
The simple scoring system used here, seemed to reflect the studies
most consistently.
A negative mood induction mismatch was scored when
experimental conditions were likely to induce a clear difference
between what subjects expected and what actually happened. To
be considered negative, subjects’ expectations should be better
than the obtained outcomes due to mood manipulations, i.e., the
manipulation for mood induction was worse than expected by the
tested subjects. In these cases, the subjects’ previous conditions
were often deteriorated. Such conditions included at least one
and potentially several of the following points (with exemplary
studies):
• a change in environment such as a reduction in the level
of enrichment (perches removed, Bateson and Matheson,
2007), reducing space allowance (animals housed at high
density, Douglas et al., 2012; metabolic cages, Barker
et al., 2016), introducing unpredictable housing conditions
(unattainable food, sudden unfamiliar noise, Doyle et al.,
2011b; unpredictable aversive events occurring at different
times of the day, Destrez et al., 2013) or deteriorating
lighting conditions (reverse light/dark cycle, Harding et al.,
2004),
• a decrease in the quality of human-animal interactions
such as rough human contact (talking loudly and abruptly,
turning animals on their back, immobilization, catching
and picking an animal up, hitting the back of an animal
with the hand, shaking aluminum leaves near it, Brajon
et al., 2015), reduction in positive human contact (absence
of the owner, Muller et al., 2012; no human interaction,
Brajon et al., 2015), or unpleasant handling (tattoing,
foot bath treatment, transportation, Doyle et al., 2011b;
shearing, Sanger et al., 2011; tilting cage, Chaby et al., 2013;
dehorning, Daros et al., 2014),
• inter-specific contact with a potential predator in a situation
that subjects had previously experienced as safe (animals
vigorously shaken simulating a predator attack, Bateson
et al., 2011; animal confronted with predator, Doyle et al.,
2011b),
• a decrease or change in intra-specific contact after subjects
had experienced a stable social situation, such as isolation
(Salmeto et al., 2011), separation (from the dam, Daros
et al., 2014), mixing with unfamiliar congeners (introducing
a stranger of the same species, Harding et al., 2004; daily
social defeat in an resident–intruder paradigm, Papciak
et al., 2013), or unpleasant odor (conspecifics blood/urine
odors from slaughterhouse, Destrez et al., 2013),
• a pharmacological treatment likely to mimic one of the
conditions mentioned above such as a stress-inducing drug
(combined noradrenergic-glucocorticoid injection, Enkel
et al., 2010; administration of p-Chlorophenylalanine,
Doyle et al., 2011a),
• the recording of a specific behavior that is likely to
reflect previous suffering or anxiety such as stereotypy
(head twirls, Pomerantz et al., 2012; back-flipping, Novak
et al., 2016), fearfulness (animal afraid by a novel object,
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Carreras et al., 2016), rumination (anxious person, Schick
et al., 2013) or separation distress (in dogs, Mendl et al.,
2010a) that were thought to be the effect of conditions as
mentioned above,
• a history of poor welfare thought to have consisted of a
combination of conditions as listed above (kennel housed
animals at rehoming center, Titulaer et al., 2013),
• a clinically depressed state such as a genetic animal model
of depression (congenitally helpless animals, Richter et al.,
2012; high initial anxiety phenotype, Kloke et al., 2014) or
depression in humans (Schick et al., 2013) that otherwise
develop if subjects are confronted with conditions as listed
above.
A positive mood induction mismatch was scored when
experimental conditions for mood manipulation were likely to
surpass the subjects’ expectations. To be considered positive,
subjects’ expectations should be worse than the obtained
outcomes due to mood manipulation, i.e., the manipulation for
mood induction resulted in outcomes better than expected by the
tested subjects. In these cases, the subjects’ previous conditions
were often improved. Such conditions included at least one
and potentially several of the following points (with exemplary
studies):
• a change in environment such as providing enrichment
(shredded paper nesting material, Burman et al., 2008;
perches, Matheson et al., 2008; attractive items in respect
to playing behavior, Keen et al., 2014), increasing space
allowance (animals housed in a multilevel caging system,
Wheeler et al., 2015), introducing predictable housing
conditions (light signal before food, Destrez et al.,
2014), or increasing thermal comfort (animal under high
temperature, Deakin et al., 2016),
• improve human–animal interactions such as gentle human
handling after they had experienced neutral or negative
interactions only (tickling the animals, Rygula et al., 2012;
brushing the animals, Destrez et al., 2014; habituating the
animals to the human presence, talking softly to them,
Brajon et al., 2015),
• improve intra-specific contact such as pasturing with
conspecifics (access to pastures and conspecifics after being
kept singly, Löckener et al., 2016),
• introduce rewarding events such as offering food items or
increasing cognitive demand (learning to search food in a
maze, Burman et al., 2011),
• a pharmacological treatment likely to mimic one of the
conditions mentioned above such as an antidepressant
(Citalopram, Rygula et al., 2014), anxiolytic (Diazepam,
Destrez et al., 2012), or stimulant drug (d-Amphetamine,
Rygula et al., 2014).
Sixteen studies used negative and positive mismatch as defined
above in the same study and applied the two types of mismatches
to two groups that were then compared. These studies were too
rare to consider the impact of negative and positive mismatch
independently within a given study. If we had considered these
few cases with two different mismatches, the predictor variable
mood induction mismatch would have become a within-study
variable and no longer a between-study variable. The latter
was more appropriate for the large majority of the studies,
though. Therefore, studies including a positive manipulation
in one treatment group along with a negative manipulation in
another treatment group were scored as negative mismatch only,
because negative events are often thought to be more ecologically
relevant.
When none of the previous criteria was observed, no mood
induction mismatch was scored (18 independent tests in total).
Testing Mismatch
The mismatch according to the testing procedure for the
cognitive bias itself (‘testing mismatch’) was assessed and
categorized also as either a negative mismatch, no mismatch, or
a positive mismatch. Criteria for testing mismatches were based
on studies that emphasized such a potential effect (e.g., Burman
et al., 2009; Brilot et al., 2010; Doyle et al., 2010). We then applied
these criteria also to all other publications in our sample. This
mismatch was related to the treated group only (not the control
group).
A negative testing mismatch was considered when one or
several of the following events took place in the cognitive bias
test (with exemplary studies):
• a learning effect, that is, a habituation about the outcomes
of ambiguous cues in term of decreasing responses to
unrewarded probes because they had the same effect as the
negative probes (decrease the frequency, Doyle et al., 2011b;
increase the latency, Murphy et al., 2013),
• a negative anticipation of the test because the treated
subjects were less motivated to perform the test than the
control ones. For instance, in Burman et al. (2011), the
treated subjects had a food reward before the test and were
then less motivated than the control animals to search food
in the maze,
• when one of the listed points for the negative mood
induction mismatch was applied during the test.
A positive testing mismatch was considered when at least one
of the following events appeared (with exemplary studies):
• a positive anticipation of the test (motivation related to
anticipation of reward, Briefer Freymond et al., 2014),
• when the judment bias test was less stressful than the
mood induction procedure (release from a negative state
experienced during treatment, Doyle et al., 2010; stimulated
during the test as a consequence of unpredictable housing
treatment, Parker et al., 2014),
• when one of the listed points for the positive mood
induction mismatch was applied during the test.
When none of the previous criteria was observed, no testing
mismatch was scored. As previously, when several mismatches
occurred, no attempt was made to integrate them in, for example,
several levels of scoring negative and positive mismatch.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2197
fpsyg-08-02197 December 12, 2017 Time: 16:38 # 6
Raoult et al. Mood As Cumulative Expectation Mismatch
Inter-Observer Agreement
The outcome of the cognitive bias test was assessed by one scorer
only (CR). In contrast, the mood induction mismatch and the
testing mismatch were independently assessed by two scorers
(CR, JM). The first scorer (CR) had access to the full publications
and developed the list of criteria from an initial set while scoring.
In contrast, the second scorer (JM) had access to the Methods
section of the publications only. Moreover, she scored the studies’
mismatches solely based on the finalized criteria listed above. This
scorer was additionally blinded for the studies’ background and in
respect to our hypotheses. The aim was to assess the studies with
the least possible bias. The assessments of the two scorers were
then compared.
The scorers differed in respect to 47 independent tests (41
studies, respectively) in the assignment of the mismatches.
However, the number of independent tests per study and some
aspect of the testing could not be properly determined in 22 and
11 cases, respectively, based on the Methods section alone. For
the final 14 cases, the second scorer (JM) had overlooked one of
the listed criteria. Therefore, when information was completed
and all items of the criteria list were considered the two observers
fully agreed.
Statistic
Statistical analyses were performed in R version 3.3.2 (R Core
Team, 2016) using a proportional odds model (package MASS,
Ripley et al., 2016). The outcome variable was the success of
the cognitive bias test (ordered three-level factor: contrary-
none-fitting). Explanatory variables were the mood induction
mismatch (three-level factor: negative-none-positive) and the
testing mismatch (three-level factor: negative-none-positive). All
the combinations of mood induction mismatch and testing
mismatch did occur. Nevertheless, four of the combinations
were observed only at very low numbers (3 or less observations
for the negative and positive testing mismatch combined with
either no or positive mood induction mismatch). Accordingly,
a full model did not seem meaningful because the counts of
the different potential outcomes in these rare combinations
need to be considered random to a large extent. Therefore,
the effect of the mood induction mismatches was evaluated
for those tests only that had no testing mismatch (Figure 1,
left). Also, the effects of the testing mismatch were evaluated
in those studies only that had a negative mood induction
mismatch (Figure 1, right). To support model interpretation,
p-values were calculated for the predictors using a likelihood-
ratio test.
RESULTS
In the studies without testing mismatch, there was a slightly
higher proportion of successful cognitive bias studies
when there was no cumulative mood induction mismatch
compared with either a positive or a negative mismatch. Even
though this difference was around 20% it was not clearly
supported by a low p-value (χ22 = 2.87, p = 0.24; Figure 1,
left).
FIGURE 1 | Success of independent cognitive bias tests (dark gray: fitting with
the hypothesis, light gray: none, white: contrary to the hypothesis) in function
of the mood induction mismatch (–: negative, 0: none, +: positive) and the
testing mismatch (–: negative, 0: none, +: positive). N: number of independent
tests in each combination. Black lines: model estimates that reflect the
probability of the switches from one level in the outcome variable to the next.
With a negative cumulative mood induction mismatch, the
success of cognitive bias studies decreased from no testing
mismatch and a negative testing mismatch to a positive
testing mismatch (χ22 = 19.04, p = 0.00007; Figure 1,
right).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this review was to test whether cumulative mismatch
could indeed have led to the observed decision biases in cognitive
bias studies. This would then indicate that the cumulative
mismatch had led to a change in mood. We expected that the
experimental mood induction would be successful if it included
cumulative mismatch. In these cases, we anticipated a cognitive
bias test outcome fitting with the hypothesis. Yet, mood induction
mismatch did not strongly predict success of the cognitive bias
test. The effect of the mood induction mismatches could be
evaluated for those tests only that had no testing mismatch.
This implies that, as far as we know, the cognitive bias test
outcome results were not influenced by a testing mismatch
therefore increasing the probability to see an effect of mood
induction mismatch. If at all, the studies with no mismatch
were more successful in finding a cognitive bias. These findings
either indicate that the non-verbal cognitive bias tests taken as a
starting point here are not suitable for testing Eldar et al. (2016)’s
hypothesis or that the theory developed by Eldar et al. (2016)
does not hold-up, at least in the settings used. For example,
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it has been shown that a single highly arousing negative event
could, by itself, induces a change in the cognitive bias test (see
Daros et al., 2014, calves dehorning; Lee et al., 2014, restrain
and isolation stressor treatement in sheep). Whether such a
change is actually a change in mood or a more temporary
change must remain open. Mendl et al. (2010b) also argued
that mood states are likely to reflect the cumulative experience
of shorter term emotional episodes. Moreover, Bethell (2015)
in her review supported the notion that experiments using
longer-term affect manipulations showed mood-congruent shifts
in judgment bias, too. Therefore, it is more plausible that the
assessment of possible mismatches was too coarse given the
highly variable approaches used for mood induction. In some
instances, the actual occurrence of mismatches was difficult to
be certain about in particular for individuals with a ‘history
of poor welfare’ and ‘genetic animal model of depression’ that
suggest no recent change in conditions but are likely to be
a fairly long-lasting feature of each animal (e.g., personality).
In these long-term situations, mismatches may no longer be
relevant because what were mismatches initially have become
the common situation. Also, we could not be sure how long
‘anxiety behavior’ had already been shown by animals before the
studies were conducted. Moreover, the time between putative
mood induction mismatch and cognitive judgment bias testing
was not always known and variable. Indeed, we do not know
at present how long into the future a mismatch is likely to
exert its effect and how quickly repeated mismatches become
a novel situation that is considered common. Therefore, we
re-evaluated our model omitting studies including such long-
term conditions (i.e., 24 independent tests from 18 studies)
and we found that the general pattern remained the same
(see Supplementary Figure S1). The corresponding p-value for
mood induction mismatch dropped (χ22 = 7.34, p = 0.026)
indicating more strongly that, contrary to our expectation, the
outcome of the studies with no mood induction mismatch
were more likely to be as expected. This relatively low p-value
could also be just the result of conducting an additional
test (multiple testing issue). In general, most of the studies
included in our data set did not specifically focus on creating
cumulative mismatch in their approach and were therefore
more pragmatic than theory-guided. In further studies, we
advise to aim at creating cumulative expectation mismatch while
inducing mood states to explicitly test the theory by Eldar et al.
(2016).
We also expected that the success in mood induction may
be modulated if the cognitive bias testing itself produced some
short-term mismatch. The effects of the testing mismatch were
evaluated in those studies only that had a negative mood
induction mismatch because other combinations were observed
rarely. We can therefore not exclude that testing mismatch
would have a different effect after neutral or positive mood
induction mismatch, so this does not seem likely. Additionally,
there was some difficulty to assess the testing mismatches.
We cannot negate the possibility that some testing mismatches
occurred in additional studies but were not noted by neither
the original authors nor us. These studies would then have
been misclassified. Nevertheless, we found a strong pattern
for the influence of the testing mismatch after a negative
mood induction mismatch that would indicate an even stronger
pattern given some risk of misclassification. Our results show
that testing mismatch not only modulates the effect of mood
induction mismatch (at least for negative mood induction
mismatch, n = 7) but can even reverse that effect (at least
for positive testing mismatch, n = 6). For four studies (Doyle
et al., 2010; Briefer Freymond et al., 2014; Wheeler et al.,
2015; Horváth et al., 2016), this positive testing mismatch
corresponds to the notion of Baciadonna and McElligott (2015)
that releasing animals from a short-term stressor induces positive
emotional states. Doyle et al. (2010) explained that restrained
and isolated subjects had a more positive outcome in the
judgment task, either because the releasing from a restraining
situation induced a more positive emotional state than with
the unrestrained control subjects, or because the exposure to
a strong negative treatment may have altered their risk-taking
threshold. For two additional studies (Brydges et al., 2012;
Parker et al., 2014), the positive testing mismatch seems to
reflect a stimulating effect of the test that was stronger than
the mood induction condition. The tests with a negative mood
induction mismatch include two studies in which changes
occurred during the test (i.e., unexpected decrease in confort
during the test, Burman et al., 2009; Boleij et al., 2012) and
three studies in which a learning effect about the unrewarded
ambiguous probes was developed (i.e., the ambiguous cues
became negative, Brilot et al., 2010; Doyle et al., 2011b;
Murphy et al., 2013). As emphasized by Brilot et al. (2010)
and Perdue (2017), subjects may rapidly learn the meaning
of unrewarded ambiguous stimuli and this is reflected by
reducing their responding rate or latency to respond, rather than
being a negative shift in affective state. All these observations
illustrate how important the effect of the testing mismatch
could be. It is therefore crucial that this type of mismatch is
carefully accounted for in the conduction of future cognitive bias
tests.
In any type of meta-analysis, reporting bias can be a problem
(Hooijmans et al., 2014). Here, this problem may at least have
been less important given the fact that, overall, 38.89 % of the
tests included in the study sample resulted in a failure to find a
difference in cognitive bias.
CONCLUSION
Given the low support found for the cumulative mismatch
theory of mood based on the so far unsystematically conducted
non-verbal cognitive bias studies, we advise to aim at creating
cumulative expectation mismatch while inducing mood states.
Furthermore, testing mismatch should be avoided as much as
possible, because it might reverse the affective state of animals
as measured in a cognitive judgment bias paradigm.
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